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Abstract 
 
Interest rate sensitivity assessment framework based on fixed income yield indexes is 
developed and applied to two types of emerging market corporate debt: investment grade and 
high yield exposures. Our research advances beyond the correlation analyses focused on co-
movements in yields and/or spreads of risky and risk-free assets. We show that correlation-
based analyses of interest rate sensitivity could appear rather inconclusive and, hence, we 
investigate the bottom line profit and loss of a hypothetical model portfolio of corporates. 
We consider historical data covering the period 2002 – 2015, which enable us to assess 
interest rate sensitivity of assets during the development, the apogee, and the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. Based on empirical evidence, both for investment and speculative 
grades securities, we find that the emerging market corporates exhibit two different regimes 
of sensitivity to interest rate changes. We observe switching from a positive sensitivity under 
the normal market conditions to a negative one during distressed phases of business cycles. 
This research sheds light on how financial institutions may approach interest rate risk 
management, evidencing that even plain vanilla portfolios of emerging market corporates, 
which on average could appear rather insensitive to the interest rate risk in fact present a 
binary behavior of their interest rate sensitivities. Our findings allow banks and financial 
institutions for optimizing economic capital under Basel III regulatory capital rules.   
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1. Introduction 
 
As low interest rate environment in most developed countries cannot last infinitely, the 
likelihood that the U.S. Federal Reserve continues gradually raising interest rates exercises 
unprecedented pressure on the whole global financial system. The latest IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report (2015) acknowledges this situation and also points out to the risks 
of financial instability which continue to rotate toward developing economies. Emerging 
market vulnerabilities, intrinsically related to the weaknesses of balance sheet structures of 
corporations and banks, makes firms in these countries more sensitive to capital outflows 
arising as a result of financial stress and economic downturn.  
 
As financial conditions and risk premiums, accompanying rising policy rates, recover from 
historically low levels they place significant strain on bank profitability and capital adequacy 
levels. Not surprisingly one observes a growing volume of scientific research addressing 
effects of interest rate changes on bank performance and solvency. See, for example Berends 
et al (2013), Landier et al (2013), Bessis J. (2015), Fuerst et al (2015), Haddad (2015), Neal 
R. et al (2013 and 2015), Dupoyet B. et al (2016), Gubareva M. & Borges (2016) M., and 
references therein.  
 
On the other hand, the regulatory bodies try to create the widespread awareness of possible 
negative impacts of interest rate changes on bank balance sheets and profitability. For 
instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in September of this year issued for 
comment a consultative document entitled “Interest rate risk in the banking book” (2015). In 
this document, the Committee proposed changes to the regulatory capital treatment and 
supervision of Interest Rate Risk in Banking Book (IRRBB) which were set out in the 
Committee’s guidance issued more than a decade ago; see “Principles for the management 
and supervision of interest rate risk” (2004). 
 
In its turn the European Banking Authority (EBA) in May of this year published “Guidelines 
on the management of interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities” (2015). The 
guidance provided in these updated guidelines applies to the interest rate risk arising from 
non-trading activities (IRRBB), one of the Pillar 2 risks specified in the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRDIV) issued by the European Parliament (2013). The Guidelines clarify how 
institutions should take specific technical aspects into account when assessing IRRBB in their 
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP). This detailed guidance focuses 
thematically on five areas of interest risk assessment and control: scenarios and stress testing, 
measurement assumptions, methods for measuring interest rate risk, governance and 
identification of interest rate risk, and calculation and allocation of capital to interest rate risk.  
 
The above mentioned documents by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and by 
the EBA, along with the latest Global Financial Stability Report (2015) by IMF 
comprehensively outline the possible effects of interest rate increases, including changes to 
net interest margins, balance sheet structure, and values of interest-sensitive assets and 
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liabilities. At this point it becomes especially important to correctly assess an interest rate 
sensitivity of assets, which is a measure of how much the price of a fixed-income asset will 
fluctuate as a result of changes in the interest rate environment. The more the price fluctuates, 
the more sensitive to interest rate is the asset. But what is really important for managing 
IRRBB is how the prices of assets react on medium term downward or upward trends in 
interest rate dynamics.  
 
Nevertheless, the interest rate sensitivity of corporate debt is traditionally analyzed in terms 
of yield sensitivity of corporate bonds to changes in the yield curve of risk-free assets, see 
Manzoni (2002), Landschoot (2008), Boulkeroua and Stark (2010 and 2013), and references 
therein. In this context, impacts in price of assets and in a bottom line profit and loss (P&L) 
of portfolios are obfuscated as researchers main interests are centered on interest rate – credit 
spread relationship (Merton 1974), Davies (2008), Neal et al (2013 and 2015), Dupoyet B. et 
al (2016), among other corner stone studies. It is worth noting that research in this field has 
been focusing at the U.S. domestic bond market.   
 
The fact that U.S. domestic financial market for government and corporate bonds is the 
biggest in the world explains its attraction for researchers involved in empirical investigations 
of the relationship between the yield spread on corporate bonds and changes in the yield of 
U.S. government bonds, see Piazzesi & Schneider (2010), Bauer & Hamilton (2015), 
Begenau et al (2015), etc. It is not the case in this research as we address the EM corporate 
debt. Note that the importance of non-U.S. financial markets keeps growing; see Mishkin & 
Eakins (2015). For example, the level of corporate debt in EM had quadrupled between 2004 
and 2014; see the latest IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2015). In respect to the non-
U.S. markets we would like to mention a pioneering and rare research of Manzoni (2002) 
who studied the behavior of yield spreads on an ISMA Sterling Eurobond Index composed 
by bonds from different markets including Latin America, etc. Thus, additional research into 
non-U.S. corporate is highly desirable.  
 
Having a slightly different perspective and focusing on P&L sensitivity of bottom lines in 
EM portfolios, here we attempt to advance empirical research of the joint dynamics of the 
yields of risk-free U.S. Treasury bonds and risky EM corporate bonds. Hence, in our case, 
we analyze the interest rate sensitivity as a P&L sensitivity of an EM corporates portfolio, 
hedged either by short positions in U.S. Treasury bonds to changes in the yields of U.S. 
Treasury bonds, i.e., to changes in the risk-free interest rates. This work continues our 
previous research on interdependence between the credit, financial, and liquidity risks and is 
related to downside risk management and financial stability improvement; see Gubareva 
(2014), Gubareva & Borges (2014), and Gubareva & Borges (2016).  
 
This paper aims to contribute by providing answers to the following chief question: does it 
make an economic sense to hedge interest risk of U.S. dollar denominated EM corporate debt 
by short positions in U.S. Treasury bonds or by pay-fixed receive-float interest rate swaps? 
We try to respond this question separately for EM investment grade (IG) corporates and for 
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EM high yield (HY) corporates. The answers to these questions will be of particular 
importance for interest rate risk management and for dimensioning economic capital to 
allocate for mitigating this type of risk. Hence our research is potentially important not only 
for academia community, but also to financial industry players and regulatory bodies.  
   
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and details the scope of our 
studies. Section 3 introduces the methodology and assumptions developed for analyses of 
P&L volatility. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 provides discussions and 
illustrations of the implications of the obtained results, and Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
 
2. Empirical Data and Scope 
 
Being rather interested in aggregate interest rate hedge techniques at a portfolio level and not 
focusing on a cherry-picking performance of certain selected assets, we opt to study P&L 
sensitivity of model EM bond portfolios based on yield indices describing EM corporate debt 
performance. After careful studies of existing indices our choice was to use two J.P. Morgan 
Corporate Emerging Market Bond Indices: the Broad High Grade Blended Yield (Bloomberg 
ticker JBBYIGIG) and the Broad High Yield Blended Yield (Bloomberg ticker JBBYNOIG). 
As one could infer from the tickers´ abbreviations, the former presents a blended yield for 
Investment Grade bonds while the latter offers a blended yield for Non-Investment Grade 
instruments.  
 
The blended high yield emerging market corporate bond index (JBBYNOIG) is a rule based 
index engineered to measure speculative grade corporate bond performance of USD 
denominated fixed-rate corporate bonds of issuers in emerging markets as defined by J.P. 
Morgan. This index is calculated using quite a widespread universe of emerging market 
corporate debt. Over four hundred corporate bonds issued by over two hundred issuers from 
over forty emerging market countries are contributed to the blended yield index calculations. 
Similarly, the blended high grade emerging market corporate bond index (JBBYIGIG) is also 
a rule based index engineered to measure investment grade corporate bond performance of 
USD denominated fixed-rate corporate bonds of issuers in emerging markets. Its issue, issuer 
and geography coverage is similar to the one described above.  
 
These two indexes JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG provide more than 14-year long historical 
yield series, starting at December 31, 2001, which represent a considerable time interval for 
studying EM debt performance in the twenty first century. In our research the final date of 
analyzed data is put to be December 31, 2015. Of course for analyzing a dynamics of capital 
gains in debt portfolios, the price index perhaps would be a better choice, but to the best of 
our knowledge no price indexes with similar issuer, geography and historic coverage are 
available in the market. Thus, instead of researching an individual bond price histories and/or 
developing a range of bond price indexes from a selected universe of individual bond data 
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we opt for using the two above mentioned yield indexes to measure high grade and high yield 
EM corporate debt performance.  
 
As the main focus of our research is to analyze capital gains we rule out total return indexes 
as well, as the reinvestment of the net interest income proceeds does not enter the scope of 
the present research.   
 
Being interested in a P&L dynamics of modeled portfolios hedged against interest rate risk, 
we  model the basic interest rate risk hedge as a holding of short positions in US Treasuries 
with the five year maturity similar to the maturity of the above mentioned blended yield 
indexes.  To describe the dynamics of the P&L of the interest rate risk hedge we employ the 
US Global Generic rate index available through the Bloomberg terminal under the 
USGG5YR ticker whose maturity is equivalent to the maturity of the two bond indices being 
analyzed. 
 
The next section describes the methodology allowing for comprehensive analysis of EM 
corporate bond portfolios based on the time series of the broad blended yield indexes, along 
with our approach to tackle interest rate risk hedge based on shorting US Treasury bonds, 
relied on the US Global Generic rate historical series. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The basis element of our index yield-based frame work is a conversion of the available value 
of a yield into the average price of the modeled portfolios, namely IG portfolio and or HY 
portfolio. We start our explanation with an example of just one bond. Considering a 5 year 
bond with annual coupon c and face value p, the price P of this bond could be written as  
 
   ܲ ൌ 	 ௖ଵା௬ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻమ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻయ ൅
௖
ሺଵା௬ሻర ൅
௖ା௣
ሺଵା௬ሻఱ   (1) 
 
where y is a market interest rate for the level of riskiness associated with the bond under 
analyses. When the bond coupon c is equal to the yield y the bond is issued at par.  
 
Now, when we have to deal with a blended yield index we do not have any actionable 
information on the subjacent bonds coupon values; we have just yield y. So, at this point one 
needs an assumption which would permit to overcome this lack of information in order to 
find an average price of a modeled portfolio.  
 
So we employ an assumption of a “cruising speed” constant rate rebalancing of a portfolio. 
This assumption means that a bond entering the model portfolio stays in the portfolio for a 
certain holding period, say n years, and after the end of this period the bond is sold out. We 
assume that all bonds in the modeled portfolio represent equal weights. Fig. 1 schematically 
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represents the rebalancing of the model portfolio consisting at any moment in time of six 
bonds with the identic face value.  
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of a modeled portfolio rebalancing along n years 
 
Any bond after an n-year long holding period is substituted by a newly issued on-the-run 
security. As the vast majority of bonds are issued at par, this gives us a key to finding an 
average coupon of the modeled portfolio at the date d as an average of the index yield daily 
values observed over the n years prior to this date d.    
 
ܿ ൌ 1݊ ∗ 365 ෍ ݕ௜
௡∗ଷ଺ହ
௜ୀଵ
 
       (2) 
 
During this study we employed three different holding periods n of 1, 2, and 3 years. The 
choice of this time intervals will be discussed in more detail further in the text.  
 
Our research performs modeling of the two portfolios namely, EM IG and EM HY portfolios, 
as described by the JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG indexes, respectively. So now we are able 
to price each of these two model portfolios at any date covered by the employed JBBYIGIG 
and JBBYNOIG historical series. The more precisely is to say that for 1 year holding period 
the time window of reconstructed portfolio prices is 2003-2015, for 2 year holding period – 
2004-2013, and for 3 year holding period – 2005-2015. The time intervals differ as in order 
to calculate the average coupon for a chosen portfolio the appropriate rebalancing speed must 
be chosen. In other words, the time extension of the averaging window is to be set equal to 
the length of the holding period.  
   
The possibility to have historical price series for the two, IG and HY EM model portfolios 
enables us to quantify the capital gains (CG) related variations in the P&L of the modeled 
portfolios over any chosen period of time as the difference between portfolio prices subjacent 
to the two chosen dates: 
 
߂௉_ாெሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ாܲெሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ െ ாܲெሺݐሻ   (3) 
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where H stands for a time horizon over which the impact in price is analyzed.  
 
The same approach is also applied for analyzing capital gains and losses of the short positions 
in US Treasuries performing the role of hedge instruments while the performance of the 
interest rate hedged EM portfolios is studied. So, for the long positions in US treasuries we 
have straight away: 
 
߂௉_௎ௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ െ ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐሻ  (4) 
 
while dealing with the short positions we just invert the signs in the right hand side of the 
equation (4):  
 
߂௉_௎ௌ்_ௌுைோ்ሺݐ, ܪሻ ൌ ௎ܲௌ்ಽೀಿಸሺݐሻ െ 	 ௎ܲௌ்_௅ைேீሺݐ ൅ ܪሻ  (5) 
  
Being interested in average capital gains over rather extended time intervals, as a metrics of 
portfolio performance from the point of view of capital gains we use an average impact in 
price over the available window of historic price deltas: 
 
൏ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ ൐ൌ 	 	ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௧ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ.              (6)
   
In this study we analyze a variety of the rebalancing rates, i.e., bond holding periods, being 
combined with the several lengths of time horizons over which the average capital gains and 
losses of the modeled portfolios are analyzed. Table 1 below presents our selection: 
 
 
 
Table 1. Available windows of price changes for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio 
impact horizons. 
 
 
For the presented above available windows of price changes we analyze performance of the 
pure asset sides of the EM IG and HY portfolios, interest rate sensitivity of assets, the 
efficiency of hedge, downside risk exposures of hedged and unhedged portfolios as well as 
the respective upsides.  
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015
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The downside risk of the portfolio we define as the most negative move in the price of the 
portfolio, being it hedged or unhedged 
 
 ܦ݋ݓ݊ݏ݅݀݁ ൌ 	 	݉݅݊௧ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ,                (7) 
 
while the upside we define, just in the opposite manner, as a maximum gain over an analyzed 
period:  
 
ܷ݌ݏ݅݀݁ ൌ 	 	݉ܽݔ௧ ߂௉ሺݐ, ܪሻ,                  (8)
  
The meaning of all these metrics we will discuss in more detail in the next sections dedicated 
to the empiric results obtained by our approach and the discussion of their implications. 
 
 
4. Empiric results 
 
4.1. Visual and Correlation analyses of the two EM corporate bond indices. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 present the historical series of the yields as per JBBYIGIG and JBBYNOIG 
indexes, respectively. For the sake of visual comparison and spread visualization these series 
are plotted along with the US Global Generic rate as per USGG5YR index 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Blended bond yield of EM IG corporates vs. US Global Generic rate. 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 3. Blended bond yield of EM HY corporates vs. US Global Generic rate. 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Both charts depicts a substantial widening of IG and HY bond spreads over risk-free rates in 
2008 and 2009 corresponding to the gigantic flight-to-quality effect coinciding with the 
apogee of the global financial crisis. After the crisis the yields of risky and risk-free assets 
visually appear to move on parallel courses, creating a visual impression that during the six 
recent years the short position in UST would be a good hedge for EM portfolios. As we show 
later on, the problem here is that even under such circumstances the hedge efficiency is rather 
questionable, as what counts at the end is price changes of the risky and risk-free securities 
over the time horizon chosen to evaluate an impact in the portfolios´ P&L.  
 
But prior to the analysis of capital gains and losses, we would also to present a correlation 
study. Fig.4 and Fig.5 depict a behavior of Pearson coefficient for 120 days long arrays of 
movements in the yields of risky and risk-free assets.   
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Figure 4. Correlation between yields of EM IG bonds and US Global Generic rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlation between yields of EM HY bonds and US Global Generic rates. 
 
A visual comparative analysis of this two charts permits to conclude that moves in the yields 
of EM IG bonds are significantly more correlated t the moves in the rates of the risk-free 
assets than the yields of EM HY bonds. At least, the correlation coefficient for EM IG bonds 
never exhibits negative values, while the correlation coefficient for EM HY bonds almost 
half of the time stays in the negative territory, the evidencing contrarian behavior of the yields 
of speculative grade securities in respect to the UST yields. Mean values of 0,526 and 0,021 
for the IG and HY bonds, respectively, averaged over the available data history also 
corroborate with stated above. The average value of the correlation coefficient for EM HY 
bonds very closed to zero certifies a practically full absence of correlations between the yields 
of HY EM corporates and the UST.  
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We do consider this correlation analysis impactful and convincing in the sense of analyzing 
the yield behavior, but we undertake the more advanced studies by quantifying the impacts 
of the yield dynamics on the capital gains and losses of model portfolios occurred over 
diverse time horizons under several assumptions regarding the rebalancing or renewal speed 
of the portfolios. For that reason, we use the yield data to recalculate price histories for the 
selected portfolios composed of IG and HY EM corporate securities.     
 
 
4.2. Modeled portfolio prices 
 
In this subsection we present our calculations of the historic prices for the model portfolios 
under the selected assumptions regarding the time interval along which the modeled portfolio 
is completely renewed, namely of 1, 2, and 3 years. We consider the face value of the 
portfolio to be equal to 1000 million USD. Fig. 6 represents the price dynamics of the 3 EM 
IG bond portfolios with the respective bond holding periods equal to the discussed above 
time intervals.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Prices of the EM IG bond portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
 
As it appears from the comparative analysis of the price plots the price behaviors appears to 
be quite similar prior to the apogee of the global financial crisis at the end of 2008 and during 
the last three years. Still during the recovery phase one could observe major differences in 
the price behaviors. For the portfolio undergoing a complete renewal along 1 year rebalancing 
period the price bottom is not so deep as for the other portfolios while the major upside in 
prices occurs within 1Y after the bottom is reached. For the portfolios with the bond holding 
periods of 2 and 3 years the recovery spikes are not so sharp occurring over the respective 2 
to 3 year long periods. 
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Fig. 7 represents the price dynamics of the 3 EM HY bond portfolios with the bond holding 
periods equal to 1, 2, and 3 years.   
 
 
Figure 7. Prices of the EM HY bond portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
 
These plots of the HY bond portfolio prices corroborate with our conclusions regarding the 
price recovery dynamics as a function of the bond holding period which we obtained from 
the analysis of the Fig. 5 depicting prices of IG bond portfolios over the same period. It is 
worth noting that as expected we observe that the financial crisis influence on HY portfolio 
P&L dynamics is stronger than on the price behavior of the IG portfolios.  
 
Fig. 8 represents the price dynamics of the 3 UST long portfolios with the securities holding 
periods equal to 1, 2, and 3 years.   
 
 
Figure 8. Prices of the UST long portfolios with different bond holding periods. 
 
Comparing the price behavior of the risk-free UST portfolios and the risky EM portfolios one 
could conclude that the global financial crises represented a huge flight-to-quality event when 
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the prices of safe assets increased and the EM bonds decreased. On the other hand the range 
of UST price changes (roughly -5%/+15%, see Fig.8) in narrower than the range of price 
changes both, for the IG EM corporate bonds (roughly -20%/+10%, see Fig.6) and HY EM 
corporate bonds (roughly -40%/+20%, see Fig.7).  
 
 
4.3. Modeled historical series of capital gains and losses 
 
In this section we study dynamics of the historic series of the annual, biannual, and triennial   
P&L impacts experienced by the EM and UST bond portfolios. The impacts are calculated 
on the daily basis. Based o this calculations we construct the history of capital gains and 
losses for the EM portfolios hedged by the short positions in the US Treasuries. The time 
spans of the series are limited due to the availability of data and depend on the rebalancing 
speed selected for the portfolio modeling as well as on the time horizon of the studied 
impacts. 
 
 
4.3.1. EM IG corporate bond portfolios  
 
 
Figure 9 represents the time behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 1 year.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. 1-year P&L of the EM IG and UST portfolios with 1 year bond holding period.  
 
How to read this chart? The points plotted for December 31, 2003, represent changes in the 
values of the portfolios occurred over the 1 year started December 31, 2002. One clearly 
observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial crises, in 
this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite mode. 
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Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 1-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 1-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 10 shows the time 
behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds, under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 1-year time interval. 
 
 
Figure 10. 1-year P&L of the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 1 year  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 9 and 10, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, of 
1-year returns of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries is 
superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio. 
 
Figure 11 represents the time behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 2 years.  
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Figure 11. 2-year P&L of the EM IG and UST portfolios with 2 year bond holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2005, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 2 years started December 31, 2003. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2006 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 2-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 2-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 12 shows the time 
behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 2-year time interval. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. 2-year P&L of the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 2 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 11 and 12, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 2-year returns of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries 
is superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Figure 13 represents the time behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM IG 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 3 years.  
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Figure 13. 3-year P&L of the EM IG and UST portfolios with 3 year bond holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2007, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 3 years started December 31, 2004. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 3-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 3-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM IG portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 14 shows the time 
behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM IG corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 3-year time interval. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. 3-year P&L of the EM IG long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 3 years  
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As we could see by comparing Figures 13 and 14, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 3-year returns of the EM IG bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries 
is superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Table 2 provides the comparative analysis of upside and downside risk in the modeled EM 
IG portfolios of 1000 million USD, observed over the available P&L changes window as a 
function of the complete portfolio rebalancing period, i.e. the time each bond spent in the 
portfolio or the bond holding period, and of time horizon used to calculate the changes in 
P&L, i.e. capital gains and losses. 
 
 
 
Table 2. EM IG portfolios upsides and downsides for diverse bond holding periods and 
portfolio impact horizons 
 
As could be seen from Table 2 the difference between the lowest and the highest P&L 
changes for the portfolios hedged with short UST positions is always superior to that for the 
unhedged portfolios. It means that, over the considered time windows, such hedge in fact 
does not hedge against the most extreme changes in IRR of the EM IG portfolios but rather 
leverage their IRR exposure. In more details the implications of these results will be 
addressed in the section dedicated to Discussions and Implications.  
 
Table 3 provides the comparative analysis of the average performance of long EM IG 
portfolio, long UST portfolio and the hedged long EM IG short UST portfolio for several 
combinations of portfolio rebalancing rate and portfolio impact horizon interval. 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
EM IG 
max 
downside
UST short + 
EM IG max 
downside
EM IG 
max 
upside
UST short + 
EM IG max 
upside
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -167.85 -160.46 256.24 287.26
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -184.47 -209.07 245.20 283.22
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -182.52 -248.31 264.64 272.48
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -180.79 -230.29 228.31 254.94
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -188.31 -278.39 267.66 288.34
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -185.93 -297.64 239.38 266.04
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Table 3. Average returns of long EM IG, long UST, and hedged long EM IG short UST 
portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
 
 
As could be seen from Table 3 for the average returns of EM IG portfolios, they are slightly 
negative for the windows of P&L changes starting in the pre-crisis years. For the last window 
2008-2015 the average return becomes slightly positive as this P&L changes window 
predominantly covers the post-crisis recovery.  The average returns of the UST portfolios are 
predominantly positive, reflecting the fact that the variations in interest rates are largely 
downward after since 2005 as could be seen in Figures 1 and 2. In its turn this also explains 
an inefficiency of IRR hedging by short positions in US Treasuries from the point the point 
of view of improving capital gains and/or diminishing capital losses.  
 
 
4.3.2. EM HY corporate bond portfolios  
 
Figure 15 represents the time behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 1 year.  
 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM IG 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average EM 
IG + short UST 
return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -0.21% -0.06% -0.15%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -0.13% 0.10% -0.23%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -0.26% 0.15% -0.41%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -0.23% 0.20% -0.43%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -0.14% 0.42% -0.55%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 0.03% 0.57% -0.54%
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Figure 15. 1-year P&L of the EM HY and UST portfolios with 1 year bond holding period.  
 
How to read this chart? The points plotted for December 31, 2003, represent changes in the 
values of the portfolios occurred over the 1 year started December 31, 2002. One clearly 
observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial crises, in 
this case along 2007 – 2012, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite mode. 
Note that the range of changes in EM HY portfolio price is several times wider than the range 
of changes in the value of risk-free UST portfolio.  
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 1-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 1-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 16 shows the time 
behavior of the 1-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds, under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 1-year time interval.  
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Figure 16. 1-year P&L of the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 1 year  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 15 and 16, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 1-year returns of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries 
is superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio. 
 
Figure 17 represents the time behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 2 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. 2-year P&L of the EM HY and UST portfolios with 2 year bond holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2005, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 2 years started December 31, 2003. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
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crises, in this case along 2006 – 2013, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 2-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 2-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 18 shows the time 
behavior of the 2-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 2-year time interval. 
 
 
Figure 18. 2-year P&L of the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 2 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 17 and 18, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 2-year returns of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries 
is superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Figure 19 represents the time behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM HY 
corporate bond portfolio and in the risk-free UST bond portfolio, with the rebalancing rate 
of the portfolios equal to 3 years.  
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Figure 19. 3-year P&L of the EM HY and UST portfolios with 3 year bond holding period.  
 
The chart above starts with the points plotted for December 31, 2007, which represent 
changes in the values of the portfolios occurred over the 3 years started December 31, 2004. 
One clearly observes that during the period prior and after the apogee of the global financial 
crises, in this case along 2007 – 2013, the changes in the portfolio values are in an opposite 
mode. 
 
Hence, under the above mentioned assumptions regarding the portfolio strategy, i.e., 3-year 
long horizon to measure portfolio results and 3-year stay of the bonds in the portfolio, – the 
hedging of the EM HY portfolio with the short UST positions do not compensate the negative 
impacts, during the periods when such setoff is the most needed. Fig 20 shows the time 
behavior of the 3-year changes in value of the model EM HY corporate bond portfolio hedged 
by the short positions in UST bonds under the assumption of the complete portfolio 
rebalancing over 3-year time interval. 
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Figure 20. 3-year P&L of the EM HY long + UST short portfolio rebalancing over 3 years  
 
As we could see by comparing Figures 19 and 20, the volatility, i.e., the width of the range, 
of 3-year returns of the EM HY bond portfolio hedged by short positions in the US Treasuries 
is superior to the P&L volatility of the non-hedged portfolio.  
 
Table 4 provides the comparative analysis of upside and downside risk in the modeled EM 
HY portfolios of 1000 million USD, observed over the available P&L changes window as a 
function of the complete portfolio rebalancing period, i.e. the time each bond spent in the 
portfolio or the bond holding period, and of time horizon used to calculate the changes in 
P&L, i.e. capital gains and losses. 
 
 
 
Table 4. EM HY portfolios upsides and downsides for diverse bond holding periods and 
portfolio impact horizons 
 
As could be seen from Table 4 the difference between the lowest and the highest P&L 
changes for the portfolios hedged with short UST positions is always superior to that for the 
unhedged portfolios. It means that, over the considered time windows, such hedge in fact 
does not hedge against the most extreme changes in IRR of the EM HY portfolios but rather 
leverage their IRR exposure In more details the implications of these results will be addressed 
in the section dedicated to Discussions and Implications.  
 
Table 5 provides the comparative analysis of the average performance of long EM HY 
portfolio, long UST portfolio and the hedged long EM HY short UST portfolio for several 
combinations of portfolio rebalancing rate and portfolio impact horizon interval. 
 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
EM HY 
max 
downside
UST short + 
EM HY max 
downside
EM HY 
max 
upside
UST short + 
EM HY max 
upside
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -385.27 -377.88 637.58 677.71
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -421.11 -445.59 529.87 602.50
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -472.27 -538.06 683.39 695.76
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -441.70 -491.20 485.97 559.59
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -520.06 -610.99 648.14 664.14
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -576.26 -691.85 546.30 572.96
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Table 5. Average returns of long EM HY, long UST, and hedged long EM HY short UST 
portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
 
 
As could be seen from Table 5 for the average returns of EM HY portfolios, they are 
considerably negative for all the presented here windows of P&L, reflecting the fact that EM 
HY corporates bonds were affected more strongly by the global financial crisis that the EM 
IG corporates securities. As was mentioned while analyzing Table 3, the average returns of 
the UST portfolios are predominantly positive, reflecting the fact that the variations in interest 
rates are largely downward after since 2005, see Figures 1 and 2. In its turn this also explains 
an inefficiency of IRR hedging by short positions in US Treasuries from the point of view of 
improving capital gains and/or diminishing capital losses.  
 
 
4.3.3. Comparing performance of EM IG and HY corporate bond portfolios 
 
It is worth performing comparative analysis of the EM IG and EM HY portfolios. Table 6 
presents ranges of P&L volatility, calculated as the highest upside minus the lowest downside 
in a portfolio performance observed along the available window of price changes, for both 
unhedged or hedged by UST short positions types of EM IG and HY portfolios. 
 
 
 
Table 6. P&L volatility ranges for EM IG and EM HY portfolios for diverse bond holding 
periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM HY 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average EM 
HY + short 
UST return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -1.18% -0.06% -1.12%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -1.49% 0.10% -1.59%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -2.53% 0.15% -2.69%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -1.99% 0.20% -2.19%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -2.95% 0.42% -3.37%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 -3.19% 0.57% -3.76%
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Unhedged 
EM IG P&L 
volatility range
Hedged 
EM IG P&L 
volatility range
Unhedged 
EM HY P&L 
volatility range
Hedged 
EM HY P&L 
volatility range
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 424.09 447.72 1022.85 1055.59
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 429.67 492.29 950.99 1048.09
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 447.16 520.78 1155.66 1233.81
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 409.10 485.23 927.67 1050.79
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 455.97 566.73 1168.19 1275.14
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 425.31 563.68 1122.55 1264.80
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We clearly observe that the P&L volatility ranges for EM IG portfolios are more than two 
times narrower than those for EM HY portfolios. Thus, for the case of EM, our results 
explicitly attest that the returns of HY portfolios are much more volatile than the returns of 
IG ones.  
 
Table 7 below summarizes statistics for the average returns of the unhedged EM IG, EM HY, 
and UST portfolios for diverse bond holding periods and portfolio impact horizons. The last 
two columns on the right hand side of the table present the average returns of EM IG and EM 
HY portfolios, respectively, being both hedged by short positions in US treasuries.  
 
 
 
Table 7. Average returns of EM IG, EM HY, and UST portfolios for diverse bond holding 
periods and portfolio impact horizons. 
 
For the EM HY portfolios the average returns for the observed windows of price changes are 
considerably lower than the average returns for EM IG portfolios. It is somewhat expected 
result as the EM HY corporate bonds were supposed to be much more affected by the global 
financial crisis than the IM IG corporates. Still it is important to note, that the presented in 
Table 7 returns do not incorporate a part of net interest income (NII) pocketed along the 
available windows of price changes. As could be seen from Figures 2 and 3 the yields of EM 
IG and EM HY portfolios are always above 4% and 7%, respectively. Hence, the overall 
average results of holding EM portfolios during the analyzed periods are positive. This is 
consistent with conclusions from the trends of diverse total return indexes through the time 
intervals under considerations; see for example J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Composite 
(Bloomberg ticker JPEGCOMP). Nevertheless, as we are focused at interest rate sensitivity 
of assets in a sense of impacts on the present value of principal, we opt to leave NII 
considerations and total return considerations out of the scope of our analysis.  
 
  
5. Discussions and implications 
 
5.1. Binary behavior of P&L-wise interest rate sensitivity of EM bond portfolios 
Our results show overall negative relation between changes in price of EM corporate bond 
portfolios and UST risk-free securities portfolios. Our research is a pioneering study of a kind 
Bond 
Holding 
Period
Portfolio 
Impact 
Horizon
Available 
price history 
window
Available 
window of 
price changes 
Average 
EM IG 
return, (%)
Average 
EM HY 
return, (%)
Average 
UST 
return, (%)
Average 
EM IG + 
short UST 
return, (%)
Average 
EM HY + 
short UST 
return, (%)
1Y 1Y 2003-2015 2004-2015 -0.21% -1.18% -0.06% -0.15% -1.12%
2Y 1Y 2004-2015 2005-2015 -0.13% -1.49% 0.10% -0.23% -1.59%
2Y 2Y 2004-2015 2006-2015 -0.26% -2.53% 0.15% -0.41% -2.69%
3Y 1Y 2005-2015 2006-2015 -0.23% -1.99% 0.20% -0.43% -2.19%
3Y 2Y 2005-2015 2007-2015 -0.14% -2.95% 0.42% -0.55% -3.37%
3Y 3Y 2005-2015 2008-2015 0.03% -3.19% 0.57% -0.54% -3.76%
 26
in a sense that to the best of our knowledge we are unaware of any other study focused on 
interest rate sensitivity of assets in terms of P&L changes. Conceptually, on average our 
results corroborate with the findings of Dupoyet B. et al (2016) which report consistent 
negative relation between credit spread and interest rates observed over the period 1973-
2014. In a line with their findings, our results also evidence that, along the analyzed period 
2001-2015, for EM corporate debt exposures the average negative relation between changes 
in price of EM corporate bond portfolios and UST risk-free securities portfolios holds for 
both investment-grade bond and high-yield bonds 
 
Let us discuss now the difference in the asset sensitivity to interest rate as a function of the 
overall creditworthiness of assets. First, we studied a historic behavior of Pearson coefficient 
for 120 days long arrays of movements in the yields of risky and risk-free assets for both IG 
and HY bond portfolios, see Figure 4 and 5. We found that the mean values of Pearson 
coefficient for the IG and HY bonds, averaged over the available data history are 0,526 and 
0,021, respectively.  The average value of the correlation coefficient for EM HY bonds is 
much closed to zero and, hence, this number apparently certifies a practically full absence of 
correlations between the yields of HY EM corporates and the UST. Nevertheless this 
simplistic correlation approach and the presented figures do not really tell as the whole story, 
as more detailed analysis in terms of capital gains and losses clearly indicate the more 
complex nature of the interest rate sensitivity of assets. 
 
On the other hand, investigating the asset sensitivity to interest rate from the point of view of 
capital gains and losses allows us to make more detailed and comprehensive conclusions. For 
example, analyzing Figure 9 one could observe two different regimes of P&L sensitivity of 
EM IG corporate bonds: let us say “normal” regime (2004-2006 and 2013-2015) and 
“distressed” regime (2007-2012). Under the “normal” regime, Figure 9 attests that the P&L 
moves of the portfolio of EM IG corporates represent positive correlation with the P&L 
moves of the portfolio consisting of UST securities, as the respective P&L lines move closely 
and jointly within the “normal” regime intervals. On the contrary, along the “distressed” 
regime interval the sensitivity sign changes from the positive to negative: the changes in the 
portfolio values of risk-free and risky assets behave in an opposite mode.   
 
Another interesting feature to be observed is that under the “normal” regime the P&L changes 
of the EM IG portfolio are related to the P&L changes in the corresponding UST portfolio 
roughly as 1 to 1, i.e. are commensurable to each other. This situation changes dramatically 
if we are close to the apogee of the global financial crisis. Under the “distressed” regime, the 
P&L changes of the EM IG portfolio are related to the P&L changes in the corresponding 
UST portfolio roughly as -4 to 1, i.e., exposure to the interest rate risk is inverted and 
amplified.  
 
The conceptual analysis of the two paragraphs above still hold for the P&L sensitivity to the 
interest rate of the EM HY corporate portfolios as could be inferred from Figure 15. But as 
HY securities are riskier than IG securities, the EM HY bond portfolio shows different 
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degrees of interest rate sensitivity. Under the “normal” regime the P&L changes of the EM 
HY portfolio are related to the P&L changes in the corresponding UST portfolio roughly as 
2 to 1, while under the “distressed” regime, the P&L changes of the EM HY portfolio are 
related to the P&L changes in the corresponding UST portfolio roughly as -8 to 1.  
 
Thus, the absolute value of the sensitivity coefficient for HY bonds are superior to the 
sensitivity coefficient for IG bonds for both “normal” and “distressed” regimes. In respect to 
this outcome, we consider that our results corroborate to the findings of Dupoyet B. et al 
(2016) stating that HY bond credit spreads show more sensitivity to interest rates than IG 
bond credit spreads. But we call the attention that it is very important to relate the observed 
sensitivities to the general risk-on/risk-off regime of the markets, as it could influence the 
sign, i.e. direction, of sensitivities.  
 
On the other hand, averaging sensitivities over a long run could disguise the observable 
effects as spanning the window of observations over both, the “normal” market regime with 
positive sensitivity and the “distressed” market regime with negative sensitivity, one could 
occasionally find himself observing on average only one of them, the predominant one, but 
damped by the other. Eventually, depending on the span of the window over the two regimes 
one even could observe insensitivity to interest rate, meaning that on average the sensitivity 
of one sign observed along certain intervals is damped to zero by the other sign sensitivity 
observed along the rest of the observation window. So it makes us doubt in a meaningfulness 
of the findings of Dupoyet B. et al (2016) which report consistent negative relation between 
credit spread and interest rates observed over the period 1973-2014. Our research proves that 
it is not always the case, at least for the P&L changes of EM corporate portfolios along the 
years 2002-2015, and illustrates the peril of the long span averaging capable of hiding 
variation in sensitivities along the constituent short run intervals.  
 
 
5.2. Interest rate sensitivity of EM bond portfolios in relation to phases of business cycles 
 
 
Based on our analysis we proposed an explanation for both positive and negative P&L-wise 
interest rate sensitivities of the EM portfolios observed along changing economic 
conjuncture. Under the “normal” regime, the sensitivity of the P&L of the EM portfolios to 
changes in the P&L of the corresponding UST portfolio is positive. It means that the ups and 
downs in the risk-free interest rate are passed through, being augmented (HY bonds) or not 
(IG bonds), to the respective bond yields. For both, IG and HY EM portfolios, we posit that 
moderate and not abrupt increases and decreases in the risk-free interest rate do not affect the 
level of corporate creditworthiness if considered from the operations point of view.  This is 
especially true for the IG portfolios, as under the “normal” regime the P&L changes of the 
EM IG portfolio are related to the P&L changes in the corresponding UST portfolio roughly 
as 1 to 1.  
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The fact that under the “normal” regime the P&L changes of the EM HY portfolio are related 
to the P&L changes in the corresponding UST portfolio roughly as 2 to 1, we attribute to the 
presence, in HY securities, of the embedded leverage, which could be interpreted as a 
situation when the initially borrowed dollar is used in business operations to enable 
borrowing of one dollar more. For the observed EM HY portfolio based on our results we 
could estimate that the embedded leverage ratio is close to 2:1. Once again, the 
creditworthiness of EM HY bonds, if considered from the operations point of view, also 
seems not to be affected under the “normal” regime.  
 
We ascribe such “normal” regime of interest rate sensitivity to periods of sustainable 
moderate growth, i.e., growth which is not stimulated by non-conventional policy measures 
and is not fueled by any apparent boom of bubble creation resulting in practices of “panic” 
buying and inflated prices of certain types of assets. Discussing geographically diversified 
EM portfolios we certainly refer to global economic growth. Still, we posit that our reasoning 
also holds for IG and HY assets in isolated geographies selected on a regional and/or country 
basis. 
 
Let us discuss now the negative P&L-wise interest rate sensitivities of the EM portfolios 
observed under the “distressed” regime. We consider the “distressed” regime to span over 
the two consecutive phases: deterioration and recovery of economic conditions. In other 
words, in respect to the recent history, those phases are the crisis development and 
recuperation from the crisis low. We could also think of “distressed” regime as of a passage 
through a bust of a bubble to the economic bottom and then back to economy as usual.   
 
During the vicious cycle of a recession, markets enter into the risk-off mode and the risk-free 
rate behavior exhibits a downtrend dynamics due to the increasing demand for the safe assets. 
Additionally, central banks in a recession adopt a policy of reducing interest rates in order to 
stimulate the investment necessary to turn things around. In parallel, the worsening of 
economy augments the credit risk of the corporates through several mechanisms. From an 
operations point of view, business conditions in recession get worse due to the lower demand 
for product and services as uncertainty increases. Regarding the financial side of businesses, 
the deteriorating economic conditions make it difficult for companies to obtain external 
investment. Financing costs keep growing. The increase in default risk, provoked by the 
above mentioned factors, results in the widening of credit spreads for corporate bonds. 
Consequently, following our reasoning one could conclude that when interest rates are 
decreasing, the credit premia are rising, i.e., the credit spreads are widening. That is nothing 
but a well-known flight-to-quality phenomenon described through the prism of economic 
environment.   
 
During the recovery from a flight-to-quality, i.e., during a “flight-from-quality”, markets 
enter into the risk-on mode. In such periods of economic expansion, the demand for the safe 
assets drops, causing the risk-free interest rate rise. Under such conditions central banks are 
potentially more likely to adhere to the tightening of monetary policy by increasing interest 
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rates. As the economy recovers interest rate increases could even become necessary to avoid 
the overheating of the economy and keep inflation under control. Simultaneously, this 
economic recovery results in a decrease in the corporate default risk. From an operations 
point of view, corporations start to benefit from improved consumer confidence, augmented 
demand, and reduced uncertainty. Financing risk and costs also decrease. As a result, on 
average credit spreads of corporate bonds tighten. Once again, following our reasoning one 
could conclude that when risk-free interest rates are increasing, the credit premia are 
declining, i.e., the credit spreads are narrowing. That is nothing but a recovery from a well-
known flight-to-quality phenomenon described through the prism of economic environment.   
 
So, only for the “distressed” regime, to which we attribute pre-recession and post recession 
phase of business cycles, our research is in line with results of Dupoyet B. et al (2016), which 
state that the average change in interest rates (credit spreads) is negative (positive) during 
periods of recession while the average change in interest rates (credit spreads) is positive 
(negative) during periods of economic expansion. But for us the periods of economic 
expansion referred in the cited research seems to be rather the periods of recovery from 
economic cycle lows. We evidence and state that the negative relations between interest rates 
and credit spreads disappear and turn to insensitive relations (for IG corporates) and positive 
relations (for HY corporates) under the “normal” regime which we ascribed to the period of 
moderate sustainable growth present in any business cycle after the recovery from the 
preceding recession but prior to boom and consecutive bust leading to the next downturn.  
 
 
5.3. Additional Considerations  
 
Our results also corroborate with the findings of Boulkeroua and Stark (2013), observing that 
interest rate sensitivities vary across ratings categories. In our case for the EM HY portfolios 
we observe more pronounced sensitivities both, positive (under “normal” regime) and 
negative (under “distressed” regime) than for the EM IG portfolios. 
 
So now we need to address the question we tried to answer.  At the end, does it make an 
economic sense to hedge interest risk of U.S. dollar denominated EM corporate debt by short 
positions in U.S. Treasury bonds or by pay-fixed receive-float interest rate swaps? As we 
have evidenced by our results, such hedge makes sense only over the periods of moderate 
sustainable growth. On the contrary, to hedge against downside risk in times of economic 
turmoil, as suggested by our findings, it is advisable to augment exposure to IRR, for example 
by contracting pay-float receive fixed IRS. In sum, we argue that the hedging of IRR and 
downside risk should not be mechanical, but ought to be a dynamic process linked to phases 
of business cycles.    
 
Conclusion 
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In this research, we develop the proprietary framework to assess an interest rate sensitivity 
of corporate bonds portfolio based on yield indexes. We apply our model approach to two 
types of EM corporate debt: IG and HY securities. Our research advances well beyond the 
correlation analyses and even beyond the widely performed studies of the relation between 
interest rates and credit spreads as we investigated the bottom line profit and loses of different 
model portfolios.   
 
We do consider our framework has a huge potential. Our results are more convincing in a 
sense that in fact the relation between spreads and interest rate could serve only as guidance 
toward what it would look like the bottom line of the real portfolios, while our approach is 
focused on P&L of the portfolios, i.e., on what matters at the very end, or what impacts are 
to expect at the final instance. Hence, it offers important insides on a practical side of a 
downside risk hedging.  
 
The historical span of our research covers the period 2002-2015, which enables us to assess 
interest rate sensitivity of assets during the development, apogee, and aftermath of the recent 
global financial and economic crisis. The results presented in this paper contrast with the 
result of previous empirical work and their theoretical interpretations. 
 
We find empirical evidence of binary behavior of interest rate sensitivity along phases of 
business cycles. Under “normal” regime that we ascribe to the moderate sustainable growth 
period, the changes in P&L of EM portfolios the positively related to the changes in P&L of 
UST bond portfolios. On the other hand, under “distressed” regime that we ascribe to a phase 
spanned over an entry to and exit form a recession, the changes in P&L of EM portfolios the 
negatively related to the changes in P&L of UST bond portfolios.  This suggests that the 
hedging of downside risk ought to be a dynamic process linked to phases of business cycles.  
 
Examining behavior of asset sensitivity to interest rate along phases of business cycles we 
corroborate with our idea that an integrated treatment of the IRR and credit risk potentially 
allows for optimizing ECAP of banks and financial institutions. This research represents a 
contribution to the advancement of the discussion on the EM cross-geographies alignment of 
the Pillar 2 methodologies under Basel III capital accord.  
 
Looking ahead, we can affirm that the applicability of the developed herein index-based 
framework to gauge interest rate sensitivity is considerably wider than the corporate debt of 
EM. Depending on availability of yield indexes and price indexes, it can be applied to diverse 
portfolios containing fixed income assets from diverse geographies, sectors and security 
rating categories. Thus, further research in this field is highly desirable for positively 
impacting overall efficiency of financial system. It potentially allows financial institutions to 
improve their risk assessment and ECAP management.  
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